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Abstract
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using
quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model
to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some quantitative questions for general games
of growing sizes [Zha10]. However, one fundamental question that the paper did not consider
is the characterization of quantum correlated equilibria (QCE). In this paper, we answer this
question by giving a sufficient and necessary condition for an arbitrary state ρ being a QCE. In
addition, when the condition fails to hold for some player i, we give an explicit POVM for that
player to achieve a strictly positive gain. Finally, we give some upper bounds for the maximum
gain by playing quantum strategies over classical ones, and the bounds are tight for some games.
1 Introduction
Game theory studies the interaction of different players with possibly conflicting goals [OR94,
FT91, VNRT07]. Equilibrium is a central solution concept which characterizes the situation that
no player likes to deviate from the current strategy provided that all other players do not change
theirs. If each player chooses her strategy from a distribution (on her own strategy space), then the
joint product distribution is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to change her
distribution. A fundamental theorem by Nash says that any any game with a finite set of strategies
has at least one Nash equilibrium [Nas51].
Aumann [Aum74] gave an important generalization of Nash equilibrium, called correlated equi-
librium (CE), where a Referee selects a joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk) from some distribution p
and suggested si to the i-th player. The joint distribution p is a correlated equilibrium (CE) if no
player i, when sees only her part si, cannot deviate from this suggested strategy to improve her
expected payoff. The notion of correlated equilibria captures the optimal solution in natural games
such as the Traffic Light and the Battle of the Sexes ([VNRT07], Chapter 1). The set of CE also
has good mathematical properties, such as being convex, with Nash equilibria being some of the
vertices of the polytope. Computationally, it is benign for finding the best CE (of any game with
constant players), measured by any linear function of payoffs, simply by solving a linear program.
Other example include that a natural learning dynamics can lead to an approximate variant of CE
([VNRT07], Chapter 4), and all CE in a graphical game with n players and log(n) maximum degree
can be found in polynomial time ([VNRT07], Chapter 7).
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In the quantum world, quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction
of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Indeed, quantization of classical
strategic games have drawn much attention in the past decade. Despite the rapid accumulation of
literature [EWL99, BH01b, LJ03, FA03, FA05, DLX+02a, DLX+02b, PSWZ07], the whole picture
of the area is not as clean as one desires, partially due to controversy in models [BH01a, CT06].
Recently, Zhang proposed a new model which is simpler, arguably more natural, and corresponding
more precisely to the classical strategic games [Zha10]; also see that paper for a review of the
existing literature under the name of “quantum games”. Other than the model, what mainly
distinguishes that work from previous ones is the generality of the classical game it studies: Unlike
previous work focusing on specific games of small sizes or refereed extensive games, the paper studies
general strategic games of growing sizes. In addition, rather than aiming at qualitative questions
such as whether playing quantum strategies has any advantage as in previous work, [Zha10] studies
quantitative questions such as how much quantum advantage can a general-sized game have.
Solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium are naturally extended
to the quantum model in [Zha10], and it is studied how well standard maps between classical
and quantum states preserves equilibrium properties. It turns out that if p is a classical Nash
equilibrium, then both ρ =
∑
s p(s)|s〉〈s| and |ψ〉 =
∑
s
√
p(s)|s〉 are quantum Nash equilibria.
But correlated equilibrium is of a different story: While ρ =
∑
s p(s)|s〉〈s| is still guaranteed
to be a quantum correlated equilibrium if p is a classical correlated equilibrium, the mapping
of p 7→ |ψ〉 = ∑s√p(s)|s〉 can severely destroy the correlated equilibrium property. Therefore,
correlated equilibrium is a subtler subject to study.
Given the importance of correlated equilibrium in game theory and computer science, it is
desirable to well understand quantum correlated equilibria. One fundamental question that [Zha10]
did not address is the following: For an arbitrary (classical) strategic game, can we characterize all
the quantum correlated equilibria (QCE) in the quantum game?
In this paper, we answer this question by giving the following sufficient and necessary condition
for any given game and any state ρ.
Theorem 1 A quantum state ρ in space H is a QCE if and only if for each player t, when we
write ρ = [ρi1i2j1j2 ]i1j1,i2j2, where i1, i2 ∈ [m]
def
= {1, 2, ...,m} and j1, j2 ∈ [n] with m = dim(Ht) and
n = dim(H−t), we have
Bi
def
=
[∑
j
ρi1i2jj (aij − ai1j)
]
i1i2
 0, ∀i ∈ [m]. (1)
We first show that the condition is sufficient by working out the gain of the POVM {Ei} as∑
i tr(EiBi), and then give two different proofs for the necessity part. The first one is based on
semi-definite program, which is simple yet not intuitive enough. The second proof is constructive,
which shows that when the condition fails to hold for some player i, one can find an explicit POVM
for that player to achieve a strictly positive gain. Finally, for those cases that are not QCE, we
give some upper bounds for the maximum gain, which are shown to be tight for some games.
The paper is organized as follows. Some preliminary knowledge is introduced in Section 2. In
Section 3 we give the sufficient and necessary condition, and in Section 4 the necessity part is
reproved constructively, which can be regarded as the operational explanation of this condition. In
Section 5, we obtain some upper bounds of the gain when ρ is not a QCE. Some open problems
are listed in Section 6.
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2 Definitions and notation
A matrix A ∈ Cn×n is a Hermitian if A† = A, or equivalently, A has a spectral decomposition
and all eigenvalues are real numbers. A matrix A ∈ Cn×n is a positive (semi-definite), written
as A  0, if 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all column vectors |ψ〉. Equivalently, A  0 if and only if A has a
spectral decomposition and all eigenvalues are nonnegative numbers. Thus all positive matrices are
Hermitians. Define A  0 if −A  0.
2.1 Classical strategic games
Suppose that in a classical game there are k players. Each player i has a set Si of strategies. To
play the game, each player i selects a strategy si from Si. We use s = (s1, . . . , sk) to denote the
joint strategy selected by the players and S = S1 × . . . × Sk to denote the set of all possible joint
strategies. Each player i has a utility function ui : S → R, specifying the payoff or utility ui(s)
to player i on the joint strategy s. We use subscript −i to denote the set [k] − {i}, so s−i is
(s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sk).
Definition 1 A pure Nash equilibrium is a joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S satisfying that
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [k],∀s′i ∈ Si.
A (mixed) Nash equilibrium (NE) is a product probability distribution p = p1× . . .×pk, where each
pi is a probability distributions over Si, satisfying that
∑
s−i
p−i(s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i
p−i(s−i)ui(s
′
i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀si, s′i ∈ Si with pi(si) > 0.
There are various extensions of (mixed) Nash equilibria. Aumann [Aum74] introduced a relax-
ation called correlated equilibrium. This notion assumes an external party, called Referee, to draw
a joint strategy s = (s1, ..., sk) from some probability distribution p over S, possibly correlated
in an arbitrary way, and to suggest si to Player i. Note that Player i only sees si, thus the rest
strategy s−i is a random variable over S−i distributed according to the conditional distribution
p|si , the distribution p conditioned on the i-th part being si. Now p is a correlated equilibrium if
any Player i, upon receiving a suggested strategy si, has no incentive to change her strategy to a
different s′i ∈ Si, assuming that all other players stick to their received suggestion s−i.
Definition 2 A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a probability distribution p over S satisfying that
∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i
p(si, s−i)ui(s
′
i, s−i), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀si, s′i ∈ Si.
Notice that a correlated equilibrium p is an Nash equilibrium if p is a product distribution.
2.2 Quantum strategic games
In this paper we consider quantum games which allows the players to use strategies quantum
mechanically. We assume the basic background of quantum computing; see [NC00] and [Wat08]
for comprehensive introductions. The set of admissible super operators, or equivalently the set of
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completely positive and trace preserving (CPTP) maps, of density matrices in Hilbert spaces HA
to HB, is denoted by CPTP(HA,HB). We write CPTP(H) for CPTP(H,H).
For a strategic game being played quantumly, each player i has a Hilbert space Hi = span{si :
si ∈ Si}, and a joint strategy can be any quantum state ρ in H = ⊗iHi. The players are supposed
to measure the state ρ in the computational basis, giving a distribution over the set S of classical
joint strategies, and yielding a payoff for each player. Therefore the (expected) payoff for player i
on joint strategy ρ is
ui(ρ) =
∑
s
〈s|ρ|s〉ui(s). (2)
Please refer to [Zha10] for more explanations of the model.
Corresponding to changing strategies in a classical game, now each player i can apply an ar-
bitrary CPTP operation on Hi. So the natural requirement for a state being a quantum Nash
equilibrium is that each player cannot gain by applying any admissible operation on her strat-
egy space. The concepts of quantum Nash equilibrium, and quantum correlated equilibrium, and
quantum approximate equilibrium are defined in the following, where we overload the notation by
writing Φi for Φi ⊗ I−i if no confusion is caused.
Definition 3 A quantum Nash equilibrium (QNE) is a quantum strategy ρ = ρ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρk for
some mixed states ρi’s on Hi’s satisfying that
ui(ρ) ≥ ui(Φi(ρ)), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀Φi ∈ CPTP(Hi).
Definition 4 A quantum correlated equilibrium (QCE) is a quantum strategy ρ in H satisfying
that
ui(ρ) ≥ ui(Φi(ρ)), ∀i ∈ [k], ∀Φi ∈ CPTP(Hi).
An ǫ-approximate quantum correlated equilibrium (ǫ-QCE) is a quantum strategy ρ in H satisfying
that
ui(Φi(ρ)) ≤ ui(ρ) + ǫ, ∀i ∈ [k],∀Φi ∈ CPTP(Hi).
When we later characterize quantum correlated equilibrium, we will need that no player can
increase her payoff, so a condition is required for each player. For easy presentation, we fix an
arbitrary player, say, Player 1, and consider the possible increase of her payoff by local operations.
Write the state as
ρ =
[
ρi1i2j1j2
]
i1j1,i2j2
,
where i1, i2 ∈ H1 and j1, j2 ∈ H−1. Suppose that the dimensions of H1 and H−1 are m and n,
respectively.
3 Characterization of quantum correlated equilibrium
We will first give an explicit expression of the gain of Player 1 applying the POVM {Ei} (compared
to the measurement in the computational basis).
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Lemma 2 Suppose Player 1 uses the POVM measurement E = {Ei} and other players use M =
{|j〉〈j|} to measure their parts in the computational basis, then the gain of Player 1 by applying E
than measuring in the computational basis is
Gain
def
= u1
(
(E ⊗M)ρ)− u1(ρ) =∑
i
tr(EiBi), where Bi =
[∑
j
ρi1i2jj (aij − ai1j)
]
i1i2
.
Proof The probability of getting (i, j) is tr((Ei ⊗ |j〉〈j|)ρ) =
∑
i1,i2
Ei(i1, i2)
∗ρi1i2jj . Note that∑
ij
∑
i1i2
Ei(i1, i2)
∗ρi1i2jj ai1j =
∑
i1i2j
(∑
i
Ei(i1, i2)
∗
)
ρi1i2jj ai1j =
∑
i1j
ρi1i1jj ai1j =
∑
ij
ρiijjaij (3)
where the second equality is because being a POVM measurement, {Ei} satisfies
∑
iEi(i1, i2) =
δi1,i2 . Therefore,
Gain =
∑
ij
(∑
i1,i2
Ei(i1, i2)
∗ρi1i2jj − ρiijj
)
aij (4)
=
∑
ij
∑
i1,i2
Ei(i1, i2)
∗ρi1i2jj aij −
∑
ij
∑
i1,i2
Ei(i1, i2)
∗ρi1i2jj ai1j (5)
=
∑
i
∑
i1,i2
Ei(i1, i2)
∗
∑
j
ρi1i2jj (aij − ai1j) (6)
=
∑
i
tr(E†iBi) =
∑
i
tr(EiBi) (7)

The above lemma immediate gives a sufficient condition for a state ρ being a QCE.
Theorem 3 If for each player, the corresponding Bi  0 for all i ∈ [m], then ρ is a QCE.
Proof By the above lemma, the gain
∑
i tr(EiBi) ≤ 0 because each Bi  0 and each Ei  0.
Since this holds for all possible POVM {Ei}, ρ is a QCE by definition. 
Next we will use SDP duality to show that the condition is also necessary.
Theorem 4 Suppose ρ is a QCE, then for each player t, when we write ρ = [ρi1i2j1j2 ]i1j1,i2j2, where
i1, i2 ∈ [m] and j1, j2 ∈ [n] with m = dim(Ht) and n = dim(H−t), we have
Bi
def
=
[∑
j
ρi1i2jj (aij − ai1j)
]
i1i2
 0, ∀i ∈ [m]. (8)
Proof Since ρ is a QCE, Player t cannot increase her payoff by applying any POVM. Therefore,
the value of the following maximization problem
max
∑
i
tr(EiBi)
s.t. Ei  0, ∀i ∈ [m],
m∑
i=1
Ei = Im
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is equal to 0. The dual of the SDP is the following.
Dual:
min tr(Y )
s.t. Y  Bi, ∀i ∈ [m]
Note that Y (i, i) ≥ Bi(i, i) = 0, so the optimal value being 0 implies that all Y (i, i) = Bi(i, i) = 0.
But Y − Bi  0, so actually the i-th row of Y − Bi is all 0. Since the i-th row of Bi is 0, so the
i-th row of Yi is 0. Thus the entire Y = 0, giving the claimed relation Bi  0. 
Since a negative matrix is a Hermitian, an immediate corollary is as follows. Why this corollary
is valid has an operational explanation, which will be shown in the next section.
Corollary 5 If ρ is a QCE, then
∑
j
ρi1i2jj ai1j =
∑
j
ρi1i2jj ai2j , ∀i1, i2 ∈ [m]. (9)
Both necessary conditions in Theorem 4 and the above corollary are not constructive in the sense
that if ρ is not a QCE, they do not provide an explicit POVM to realize a strictly positive gain of
payoff. We will resolve this issue in the next section.
4 A constructive proof of the characterization
In last section, we give two necessary conditions Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), the first of which is also
sufficient (while the second is not by itself). In this section, we will give explicit local operations
to increase the payoff if these conditions are not satisfied. We will first study in Section 4.1 the
scenario that Eq. (9) is violated, in which case a local unitary operation is explicitly given to achieve
a positive gain. Based on this result, we will then consider in Section 4.2 the general scenario of
Eq. (8) being violated, in which case we will exhibit an explicit POVM with a positive gain for the
player.
4.1 Eq. (9) violated: gain by an explicit local unitary
Lemma 6 If
∑
j ρ
i1i2
jj ai1j 6=
∑
j ρ
i1i2
jj ai2j for some i1, i2 ∈ [m], then there exists an explicit unitary
only on span{|i1〉, |i2〉} to make an increase of payoff for the player.
Proof Consider the unitary operator U defined by
U |i1〉 = u11|i1〉+ u12|i2〉,
U |i2〉 = u21|i1〉+ u22|i2〉.
The new probability distribution of strategy after the operation of U † on span{|i1〉, |i2〉} and identity
on other i’s is
pij = Tr((U |i〉〈i|U † ⊗ |j〉〈j|)ρ). (10)
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where we overload the notation by writing U for U ⊗ I[m]−{i1,i2}. Note that when i ∈ [m]−{i1, i2},
pij = Tr(|i〉〈i| ⊗ |j〉〈j|)ρ) = ρiijj. Thus, the gain of Player 1 by the operation Ψ is
Gain =
∑
ij
(
pij − ρiijj
)
aij
=
∑
j
(
pi1j − ρi1i1jj
)
ai1j +
∑
j
(
pi2j − ρi2i2jj
)
ai2j
=
∑
j
( 2∑
a,b=1
ρiaibjj u
∗
1,iau1,ib − ρi1i1jj
)
ai1j +
∑
j
( 2∑
a,b=1
ρiaibjj u
∗
2,iau2,ib − ρi2i2jj
)
ai2j
=
∑
j
(
|u11|2ρi1i1jj + u∗11u12ρi1i2jj + u11u∗12ρi2i1jj + |u12|2ρi2i2jj − ρi1i1jj
)
ai1j
+
∑
j
(
(|u21|2ρi1i1jj + u∗21u22ρi1i2jj + u21u∗22ρi2i1jj + |u22|2ρi2i2jj − ρi2i2jj
)
ai2j .
Since U is a unitary operation, we have
u∗11u12 + u
∗
21u22 = 0, u11u
∗
12 + u21u
∗
22 = 0, (11)
and
|u11|2 + |u21|2 = 1, |u12|2 + |u22|2 = 1. (12)
Thus, we obtain
Gain = u∗11u12
∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i2jj + u11u
∗
12
∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi2i1jj
−|u12|2
∑
j
(
ai2j − ai1j
)
ρi2i2jj − |u21|2
∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i1jj
Since
∑
j(ai1j − ai2j)ρi1i2jj 6= 0, we have
∑
j(ai1j − ai2j)ρi2i1jj =
∑
j(ai1j − ai2j)(ρi1i2jj )∗ 6= 0 as well.
Define a positive real number c by
c =
max
{∑
j
(
ai2j − ai1j
)
ρi2i2jj ,
∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i1jj
}
∣∣∣∑j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i2jj
∣∣∣ .
which is just to make
∑
j
(
ai2j − ai1j
)
ρi2i2jj < c
∣∣∣∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i2jj
∣∣∣,
and ∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i1jj < c
∣∣∣∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi2i1jj
∣∣∣.
Now one could choose u11 =
√
1− x, and u12 = eir
√
x, where x is a positive real number, and r is
a proper real number such that u∗11u12
∑
j(ai1j − ai2j)ρi1i2jj is also a positive real number. It can be
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checked that if 0 < x < 1
c2+1
, we have
u11
|u12| =
√
1− x
x
> c,
which implies
Gain = 2|u11| · |u12|
∣∣∣∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i2jj
∣∣∣
−|u12|2
∑
j
(
ai2j − ai1j
)
ρi2i2jj − |u21|2
∑
j
(
ai1j − ai2j
)
ρi1i1jj
> 0.

4.2 Eq. (8) violated: gain by an explicit POVM
In the rest of this section, we assume that condition Eq. (9) holds, because otherwise there exists
explicit local unitary operation to increase the payoff.
First note that under this assumption, all matrices Bi =
[∑
j ρ
i1i2
jj (aij−ai1j)
]
i1i2
are Hermitians.
Indeed, we have
Bi(i2, i1)
∗ =
∑
j
(ρi2i1jj )
∗(aij − ai2j) (because aij, ai2j ∈ R) (13)
=
∑
j
ρi1i2jj (aij − ai2j) (because ρ is Hermitian) (14)
=
∑
j
ρi1i2jj (aij − ai1j) (by Eq. (9)) (15)
Therefore all Bi’s have spectral decompositions.
Now suppose that Bi  0 is not true for some i ∈ [m]. Without loss of generality, assume that
i = 1, namely B1 has a positive eigenvalue. We denote it by λ, and the corresponding eigenvector
(with unit ℓ2 norm) is |ψ〉. Note that the first row contains all 0’s, and since we assumed Eq. (9), so is
the first column. This allows us to write |ψ〉 = (0, v2, v3, ..., vm)T for some vi’s. For the convenience
of our discussion, we suppose |v2| 6= 0. Otherwise, since 〈φ|B1|φ〉 is a continuous function of |φ〉,
one can always perturb |ψ〉 a little to get another vector |ψ′〉 such that λ′ = 〈ψ′|B1|ψ′〉 > 0 and the
second entry of |ψ′〉 is not 0 (while still keeping the first entry being 0). Then we replace |ψ〉 and
λ by |ψ′〉 and λ′ in the following argument.
In the following, we will construct a local POVM {Ei} by which Player 1 can strictly increase
her payoff, which will complete the proof. Set {Ei} to be
E1 = ε|ψ〉〈ψ| + |1〉〈1| =


1 0 0 · · · 0
0 ε|v2|2 εv2v∗3 · · · εv2v∗m
0 εv∗2v3 ε|v3|2 · · · εv3v∗m
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 εv∗2vm εv
∗
3vm · · · ε|vm|2


, (16)
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E2 =


0 0 0 · · · 0
0 d22 −εv2v∗3 · · · −εv2v∗m
0 −εv∗2v3 d23 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 −εv∗2vm 0 · · · d2,m


, (17)
E3 =


0 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 d33 −εv3v∗4 · · · −εv3v∗m
0 0 −εv∗3v4 d34 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 −εv∗3vm 0 · · · d3,m


, (18)
...
Em−1 =


0 · · · 0 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 0 0
0 · · · 0 dm−1,m−1 −εvm−1v∗m
0 · · · 0 −εv∗m−1vm dm−1,m


, (19)
Em =


0 · · · 0 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 dmm


. (20)
Here, ε is a small positive number that will be determined later. For any fixed ε, we will choose
dij ’s as follows. Firstly, note that we have the relationship
E1 + E2 + ...+Em = I, (21)
by which one can obtain that d22 = 1 − ε|v2|2. Let d2k = (ε|v2vk|)2/d22, thus d21d2k = (ε|v2vk|)2
and E2  0. After fixing E2, d33 can also be gotten by using
∑
iEi = I. In general, we have
dii = 1− ǫ|vi|2 − d2,i − · · · − di−1,i, ∀i ≥ 3, (22)
dik = ǫ
2|vivk|2/dii, ∀i ≥ 2, k ≥ i+ 1 (23)
By an induction on i, it is not difficult to see that for any fixed Bi’s, for ǫ→ 0, it holds that
dii = 1− ǫ|vi|2 −O(ǫ2) = 1−O(ǫ) > 0, ∀i ≥ 2 (24)
and
dik = ǫ
2|vivk|2/dii = O(ǫ2), ∀i ≥ 2,∀k ≥ i+ 1. (25)
It can be checked that E1 = ε|ψ〉〈ψ|+ |1〉〈1|  0, and every other Ei is also positive because it has
nonnegative diagonal entries and is actually diagonally dominant Hermitian for sufficiently small
ǫ. Besides, since the way we defined {Ei} satisfies
∑
iEi = I, {Ei} is a legal POVM.
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Next we calculate the gain of the Player by using {Ei} as in Lemma 2. Since 〈ψ|B1|ψ〉 = λ, we
have
Tr(E1B1) = 〈1|B1|1〉 + 〈ψ|B1|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|B1|ψ〉 = ǫλ. (26)
For i = 2, ...,m, note that the only nonzero off-diagonal entries of Ei are on the i-th row and
column, but those entries in Bi are zero. So only the diagonal entries of Ei and Bi contribute to
Tr(ETi Bi), and the contribution is
∑m
k=i di,k(
∑
j ρ
kk
jj (aij − akj)). Therefore,
Gain =
∑
i
Tr(EiBi) = ελ+
m∑
i=2
m∑
k=i
di,k
(∑
j
ρkkjj (aij − akj)
)
(27)
= ελ+
m∑
i=2
m∑
k=i+1
di,k
(∑
j
ρkkjj (aij − akj)
)
(because Bi(i, i) = 0) (28)
= ελ±O(ǫ2) (because of Eq. (25)) (29)
Here note that m and Bi are all fixed and only ǫ approaches to 0. So for sufficiently small ǫ, the
gain is strictly positive.
5 Upper bounds for the gain
In the above sections, we have shown how to determine whether a given quantum state is a QCE
or not. In this section, we consider those quantum states that are not QCE. According to the
definition of QCE, one can find a proper POVM {Ei} such that some player can get a strictly
positive payoff gain by this operation. A natural question is, how much is the maximal gain? In
the following theorem we provide two simple upper bounds as first-step attempts.
Theorem 7 Suppose that the maximum eigenvalue of Bi =
[∑
j ρ
i1i2
jj (aij − ai1j)
]
i1i2
is λi. Let
λ = maxi λi, then we have
Gain ≤ mλ. (30)
Proof Since Bi  λiI and each Ei is positive, it holds that
Tr(EiBi) ≤ Tr(Ei(λiI)) = λiTr(Ei).
Thus,
Gain =
∑
i
Tr(EiBi) (31)
≤
∑
i
λiTr(Ei) (32)
≤ λ
∑
i
Tr(Ei) (Tr(Ei) ≥ 0) (33)
= mλ (
∑
i
Tr(Ei) = Tr(
∑
i
Ei) = m). (34)

Another bound is the following.
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Theorem 8 Suppose that the eigenvalues of Bi =
[∑
j ρ
i1i2
jj (aij − ai1j)
]
i1i2
is λi1, ..., λim. Then
Gain ≤
∑
ij:λij>0
λij. (35)
Proof Suppose the spectral decomposition of Bi is Bi =
∑
j∈[m] λij|ψij〉〈ψij |. Then
Gain =
∑
i
Tr(EiBi) (36)
=
∑
i
Tr
(
Ei
∑
j∈[m]
λij |ψij〉〈ψij |
)
(37)
≤
∑
ij:λij>0
λij〈ψij |Ei|ψij〉 (38)
≤
∑
ij:λij>0
λij (〈ψij |Ei|ψij〉 ≤ 〈ψij |I|ψij〉 = 1) (39)

The above bounds can be pretty tight. By the dual SDP, it is not hard to see that the gain is
the following value:
min tr(Y )
s.t. Y  Bi, ∀i ∈ [m]
Consider the following example:
u1 =


1 · · · 1
0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0


m×n
, ρ =


1
mn
. . .
1
mn


mn×mn
It is not hard to verify that
B1 = diag(0, 1/m, ..., 1/m), B2 = ... = Bm = diag(−1/m, 0, ..., 0).
Therefore, the gain is tr(B1) = (m − 1)/m, which matches the second bound, and is also close to
the first bound 1.
6 Open problems
Some open problems are left for future explorations.
1. In Section 4, we show that if the condition is not satisfied for Player i, the player can use a
POVM to obtain a strictly positive gain. A natural questions is, can the POVM be replaced
by a unitary operation? In general, can the maximum gain always be achieved by a unitary
operation?
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2. Can the condition be simplified if ρ is a pure state?
3. How to improve the bounds in Section 5?
4. Can we have a nice characterization of ǫ-approximate QCE? (Results in Section 5 provide
sufficient conditions for ǫ-QCE, where the ǫ is the one of the given upper bounds. We hope
to say more.)
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